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EXPRESSIVE MERCHANDISE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC FORA
Genevieve Blake*
INTRODUCTION
People create expressive materials all the time, in endless vari-
ety.  These materials may express political or ideological affiliation,
aspirations, attempts at persuasion, social or cultural commentary,
religious devotion or righteousness, or even private assertions of
identity, passion, and dread.  “Expression,” commonly defined as
“an act, process, or instance of representing in a medium,”1 is
broad enough to include both a boisterous parade of thousands2
and an individual’s secret diary.3  Some expressions are and always
remain private, but those that enter the public sphere may come
into contact with—and conflict with—the expressions of others,
and the rules and regulations of social intercourse.4  The desire to
make public expressions is not limited to individuals or groups with
a persuasive or proselytizing purpose; expressions may be aired in
public simply as an assertion of self or to create awareness or con-
frontation.5  Public expressions can take many forms, such as pa-
rading, rallying, distributing leaflets,6 hanging posters,7 giving
soapbox speeches,8 public musical performance,9 and selling ex-
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.A. Art History, Barnard Col-
lege, 2004.  The author wishes to thank Professor Sonia Katyal for her encouragement
and invaluable assistance in writing this Comment, as well as the entire editorial
board and staff of the Journal.
1. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dic-
tionary/expression (search for “expression”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
2. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 558 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 667 (1944).
4. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 126
(1989).
5. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, To Be Irish, Gay and on the Outside, Once Again,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at 1 (detailing the St. Patrick’s Day parade); John Kifner,
Unmasked Klan is Besieged at Manhattan Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at § 1
(detailing the Ku Klux Klan parade); Robert D. McFadden, A Parade with Pride and
Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2001, at B1 (detailing the Puerto Rican Day parade).
6. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000).
7. See Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
8. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
9. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
1049
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pressive materials,10 some of which have found protection under
the “free speech” clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.11
Cities, municipalities, and other kinds of local governments have
the responsibility for allocating and maintaining public space so
that it can be used by the citizenry that pays for it, without tram-
pling the individual rights of the citizens who want to make such
use.12  Since two parades may not occur at the same time in the
same place, cities must necessarily regulate the use of public space
in such a way that at times inconveniences, delays, or mutes some
public expression.13  From this fact of civic responsibility, a judicial
doctrine has developed to permit regulations on the time, place,
and manner of public speech protected by the First Amendment.14
The test, which will be discussed in greater detail below, generally
permits cities to create reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
and manner of public expression, so long as the restrictions do not
touch the content of the expression, and are “reasonable.”15  What
is reasonable depends in part on the forum at issue;16 this Com-
ment will focus on contentions over what are known as “traditional
public fora” such as streets and sidewalks.17  Time, place, and man-
ner restrictions on the use of traditional public fora are subject to
intermediate scrutiny18 by the courts, which requires a determina-
10. Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th
Cir. 1990).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press.”).
12. See Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Better
Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 41 (2004).
13. See Randall J. Cude, Note, Beauty and the Well-Drawn Ordinance: Avoiding
Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges to Municipal Aesthetic Regulations, 6 J.L. &
POL’Y 853, 859 (1998) (“Municipal aesthetic regulations often partially abridge the
right of a citizen or group to engage in free expression, by reducing a citizen’s availa-
ble means of communicating.”).
14. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Sidewalk Distribution of Protected Speech and Other
Expressive Activities, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 211, 222-27 (Daniel Mandelker & Rebecca Rubin
eds., 2001).
15. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 126. R
16. Saxer, supra note 14, at 222. R
17. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (commenting, in dictum by Justice
Roberts, that public parks and streets “have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”).
18. In comparison, strict scrutiny applies to regulations of expression based ex-
pressly on content.  Content-based restrictions on speech in traditional public fora are
presumptively invalid, and the proponent of any such regulation must demonstrate (i)
that a compelling state interest is at stake, and (ii) that the regulation is narrowly
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tion as to whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to promote a
city’s legitimate interests, and whether there are adequate alterna-
tives for people affected by the regulation to conduct their expres-
sive activity.19  Cities have an interest in limiting the number of
people expressing themselves in public areas because unrestrained
expressive activity could lead to uncontrollable conflict between in-
dividuals or groups over space, volume, aesthetics, equal access,
viewpoint, and other points of contention.20  Thus, there is conflict
between those who want access to public spaces in which to con-
duct expressive activities, like sidewalks, and the cities in charge of
maintaining those sidewalks that wish to exercise control and re-
straint on that expressive activity—not necessarily because of the
substance of the expression, but merely because the expression
exists.
Courts have struggled to strike a balance between the interests
of individuals and cities with the application of intermediate scru-
tiny to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, and
several variations have emerged.21  This Comment will examine the
breadth of those approaches as they affect the determination of
what expression triggers First Amendment protection.  This issue is
timely in light of a recent decision handed down from the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York.22
The public expression at issue in that case was the plaintiffs’ crea-
tion and sale of hats, which the plaintiffs individually adorned by
painting them in a graffiti style.23  The City had barred the plain-
tiffs from displaying and selling their hats on the sidewalks within
the framework of a larger scheme to regulate street vending, which
it claimed “impedes the flow of pedestrian traffic . . . and . . . cre-
ates the potential for tragedy.”24
tailored to serve that interest. See McEntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334,
380 (1995).  On the other hand, speech in places other than traditional public fora
may be limited and regulated subject only to a test of “reasonableness.”  United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990).
19. Cude, supra note 13 at 863 n.38 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Edu- R
cators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
20. See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
21. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 624
(1982) (“[A]ny general rule of first amendment [sic] interpretation that chooses not to
afford absolute protection to speech because of competing social concerns is, in real-
ity, a form of balancing.”).
22. 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006).
23. Id. at 86.
24. Id. at 82-83, 84.
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Part I of this Comment will discuss the statutory framework for
the regulation of sidewalk vending in New York City, and offer
background information on the intersection of urban arts and First
Amendment theory.  Part II will examine in detail the interests on
both sides of the Mastrovincenzo case, and the balance struck by
the Second Circuit’s ruling.  Parts III and IV will compare how the
Second Circuit’s approach to delineating the scope of First Amend-
ment protection differs from those of other federal courts on the
more limited issue of public expression that does not fit into tradi-
tional models.  The term “traditional models” indicates written or
spoken language of a persuasive, discursive, or journalistic nature
that has historically enjoyed the strongest form of judicial protec-
tion.  In making this comparison, this Comment will specifically ex-
amine whether the definition of protected expression has widened
to include works of visual art, and give special attention to those
works that push the boundaries of historically favored media and
genre.
In deciding what kinds of expressive materials may fall within
the category of protected speech, the Ninth Circuit has developed a
test that requires the protection of things bearing a “religious, ideo-
logical, philosophical or political message,” as identified by court
examination.25  This differs from the new two-step test adopted by
the Second Circuit, which requires a judge—in the case of works
that are not paintings, photographs, sculptures, or prints—to first
balance a work’s expressive qualities against any utilitarian func-
tion the work might have, and then, if expression outweighs utility,
to decide if the work has enough overall expressivity to qualify for
First Amendment protection.  In the Second Circuit, paintings,
photographs, prints, and sculptures are thought to be always inher-
ently expressive, and thus do not require analysis by a court.26
While the Ninth Circuit test either ascribes protection or does not,
the Second Circuit test carves out a newly available classification
for works that are not full “expression,” but which have a
“predominantly expressive purpose,” entitling them to a thinner
layer of protection.27  Both approaches are to some extent
grounded by a wish to articulate a particular, protectable mes-
25. Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (9th
Cir. 1990).
26. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[P]aintings, photo-
graphs, prints and sculptures . . . always communicate some idea or concept to those
who view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”).
27. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2006).
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sage.28  In practice, this means that a mass-produced print—of a
landmark building for example—is automatically entitled to full
constitutional protection in New York City, and the City may not
enforce its vending-licensing regulations against any seller of such
print.  In San Francisco, however, an artist’s work is only entitled to
protection if the work she wishes to display and sell expresses one
of the above mentioned messages.  The categories are, however,
very broadly interpreted.  Back in New York, an artwork that does
not fit into the above mentioned four media categories is subject to
an amorphous judicial test of expressiveness.  Any artwork with an
element of functionality is presumptively inert, and unless its ex-
pressive qualities are found to outweigh its utility, it will not be
constitutionally protected.  Even if it is found predominantly ex-
pressive, it is only due a subordinated level of protection.29
Ultimately, Part V will argue for a re-thinking of how courts
evaluate the scope of First Amendment protection and municipal
regulation of expressive activity.  In light of the Mastrovincenzo
case, a re-evaluation of what should and should not be protected
under the banner of “free speech” is necessary, because, as argued
below, some judges have strayed far from the issue of expression in
the course of pursuing judicial and administrative expediency.  Part
of the problem with this shift of judicial attention lies with faulty
assumptions grounded in a muddled “marketplace of ideas” theory
of the First Amendment that both undervalues certain contempo-
rary expressive activity and threatens the validity of existing First
Amendment protections for visual expressive works.  Finally, this
Comment will offer a new way of examining regulations of public
expressive activities that draws from a “self-realization” theory of
the First Amendment.
I. REGULATION OF EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITIES IN
NEW YORK CITY’S PUBLIC FORA
The ennobling of public space is part of democratic culture, an-
cient and modern.30  The Greek agora has been described as “the
place of citizenship, an open space where public affairs and legal
28. See infra notes 226–33 and accompanying text.
29. Marcel Duchamp would presumably have been unable to display his Fountain
(1917) on the sidewalks of New York.  For an unpacking of Fountain, the San Fran-
cisco Museum of Modern Art has created an interactive program. See SFMOMA,
http://www.sfmoma.org/msoma/artworks/1466.html (last visited  Feb. 28, 2007).
30. See Don Mitchell, The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Definitions of the
Public, and Democracy, 85 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 108, 116
(1995).
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disputes were conducted” as well as “a marketplace, a place of
pleasurable jostling, where citizens’ bodies, words, actions and pro-
duce were all literally on mutual display.”31  Yet the Greek agora,
like many American public spaces today, were never really free;
only citizens with access to private property and power were able
to participate without mediation.32  While today’s urban sidewalks
are “largely open to all comers,”33 the owners of private property
abutting the sidewalks may have substantial influence over what
kind of expressive activity takes place there.34
Sidewalk vending, for example, has been regulated and some-
times prohibited in the United States since the nineteenth cen-
tury.35  New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani “declared war” on
street vending in the mid-nineties, as part of his larger “quality of
life” campaign for urban renewal.36  The New York City Council
has taken the position that unregulated sidewalk vending has “a
pernicious effect on both the tax base and economic viability of the
City,” in part because unlicensed vendors “siphon business from
reputable, tax-paying commercial establishments” and “impede[ ]
the flow of pedestrian traffic.”37
Why do people sell wares on sidewalks, without the benefit or
protection of municipal approval?  Some sidewalk vendors do so
because they have minimal job skills, are seeking to avoid exploita-
tion, or are taking the first step towards owning more formal busi-
31. See J. HARTLEY, THE POLITICS OF PICTURES: THE CREATION OF THE PUBLIC
IN THE AGE OF POPULAR MEDIA 29-30 (1992).
32. Mitchell, supra note 30, at 116 (“Notions of ‘the public’ and public democracy R
played off and developed dialectically with notions of private property and public
spheres.”).
33. Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
34. Id. at 12; Thomas J. Lueck, Times Sq. Gridlock .  . . on Sidewalk; Lapse in Law
Puts Hawkers in Way and Pedestrians in a Jam, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2003, at B1; see
also Mitchell, supra note 30, at 119-20. R
35. Kettles, supra note 33, at 7 (citing City of Denver v. Girard, 42 P. 662, 664 R
(Colo. 1895) (upholding an ordinance banning sidewalk-stand vending)).
36. Id. at 7-8.  Street vending was not the only form of expressive activity Mayor
Giuliani sought to curtail, in tandem with private corporate interests.  “[A]dult estab-
lishments” were almost completely eliminated from the Times Square tourism district.
See Herald Price Fahringer, Zoning Out Free Expression: An Analysis of New York
City’s Adult Zoning Resolution, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 403, 414 (1998) (“[Michael Eisner]
expressed his reservations about bringing Disney’s family-style entertainment to a
street dotted with pornography parlors.  Mr. Giuliani fixed him with a stolid gaze, Mr.
Eisner said, and stated more than once: ‘Michael, they’ll be gone.’”).
37. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(citing N.Y.C.  Local Law 40/1988, § 1).
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nesses—in other words, economic necessity.38  Cultural factors may
also be at work; in Latin America, sidewalk vending is much more
common and tolerated.39  A large number of vendors operating on
the streets of New York City sell “regular merchandise,” meaning
wares of no particular expressive importance.40  Vendors of expres-
sive materials may have additional impetus for street vending be-
yond economic necessity, namely interaction with a broad
audience.41  The situs of the expression in the public forum may
also be part of a speaker’s expression of alienation or non-repre-
sentation in traditional creative venues.42  Artists who work with
and in public space may do so expressly to re-invent what Michel
de Certeau calls “the practice of everyday life”—the use and
deconstruction of space dominated by the rich and powerful by
those excluded from it.43  The public forum doctrine confronts this
reality, at least facially, in requiring speech restrictions to survive
greater scrutiny in cases of public fora, because “parks, streets and
sidewalks often provide the economically disadvantaged with their
only access to communicative expression.”44  Yet in New York City
such expressions have been—and to some extent still are—
criminalized, regardless of their content.45
Who can sell what on a New York City sidewalk is governed by
the General Vendors Law (“GVL”).  The Administrative Code of
the City of New York defines a general vendor as one who “hawks,
peddles, sells, leases or offers to sell or lease, at retail, goods or
services . . . in a public space.”46  GVL § 20-453 requires all general
vendors seeking to sell non-food goods and services to obtain a
38. Kettles, supra note 33, at 24 (describing how some vendors “sell on the streets R
because, as a means of survival, it is the best option among the few available”).
39. Id. at 24-26.
40. See, e.g., Al-Amin v. City of New York, 979 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that sales of oils and perfumes associated with Islamic worship not suffi-
ciently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection); People v. Saul, 776
N.Y.S.2d 189, 193  (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (holding that playing cards picturing de-
posed Iraqi regime figures did not constitute expressive merchandise).
41. Mastrovincenzo, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
42. Id.
43. See ROSALYN DEUTSCHE, EVICTIONS: ART AND SPATIAL POLITICS 76-77
(1996) (referring to MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE
(1984)).
44. Cude, supra note 13, at 874. R
45. See generally Christina Mathes, Casenote, Bery v. [City] of New York: Do Art-
ists Have a First Amendment Right to Sell and Display Art in Public Places?, 5 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 103 (1998).
46. N.Y.C. Code § 20-452(b) (2005).
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license.47  Licenses cost two hundred dollars and are valid for one
year, but may be renewed indefinitely.48  The waiting list for li-
censes is effectively closed.49  Violators of the licensing require-
ment are guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine,
incarceration, and civil penalties.50  The total number of licenses in
effect at any given time is statutorily capped at the number of li-
censes in effect on September 1, 1979: 853.51  That limitation, how-
ever, is subject to a number of caveats.  Any honorably discharged
member of the United States armed forces who is a veteran of any
war, or who served overseas, and who qualifies for a vending li-
cense must be issued one.52  As of 1996, 340 such licenses had been
issued to veterans, bringing the total number of licenses in effect at
that time to 1,193.53  So, while the City Council’s maximum for li-
censes is somewhat permeable, it has limited the official number of
vendors to one for every 8,584 New Yorkers in 1990,54 and one
vendor for every 9,629 New Yorkers in 2005.55  Compared with cit-
ies like San Francisco, New York is extremely stingy with permis-
sion to vend in public.56
Beyond the GVL’s licensing requirement, general vendors are
subject to another kind of time, place, and manner restriction on
their physical operations.  GVL § 20-465 places a wide variety of
47. Id. § 20-453.
48. See id. § 20-454; Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that renewal is dependant on the licensee paying all ap-
plicable taxes and fees, and good conduct).
49. See Jonathan Hicks, Street Vendors Wary of Council Effort to Create More Li-
censes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at § 1 (explaining that getting a vending license is
practically impossible, in part because vendors may pass their licenses amongst fam-
ily); Bruce Lambert, Neighborhood Report: Lower Manhattan; Fighting for the Free-
dom to Sell Art on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at § 13.
50. N.Y.C. Code § 20-472(a) and (c)(1).  Police officers are authorized to seize the
items being sold, and the seized items are subject to forfeiture. Id. §§ 20-468, 20-
472(a).
51. N.Y.C. Local Law 50/1979; see also N.Y.C. Code § 20-459(a); Bery v. City of
New York, 97 F.3d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1996).
52. N.Y.S. GEN. BUS. LAW § 32(1) (McKinney 2007); see Mathes, supra note 45, at
105 n.17 (1998) (explaining legislative rationale for the veteran exception).
53. Bery, 97 F.3d at 692.
54. See http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tab22.txt for
1990 population of New York City (7,322,564 divided by 853) (last visited Feb. 16,
2007).
55. See Population – New York City Department of Planning, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml for 2004 population of New York City (8,213,839
divided by 853) (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
56. See Adine Y. Kernberg, Note, The Right to Bear Art: The Impact of Municipal
Anti-Peddling Ordinances on the First Amendment Rights of Artists, 18 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 155, 160 (1993).
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restrictions on vendors, e.g., setting the amount of space any gen-
eral vendor may occupy, setting the minimum width of sidewalks
open to general vendors, establishing the minimum space permit-
ted between any general vendor and a bus shelter or subway en-
trance, barring general vendors from parts of Midtown and
Ground Zero, and prohibiting vending from blankets or boxes, or
on top of steam grates.57
In 1982, the City Council amended GVL § 20-453 to exempt ven-
dors of newspapers, books, and other written materials from the
licensing requirement.58  The amendment was a reaction in part to
criticism from the courts that the regulation was chilling to free
expression.59  So, on top of the 853 vendors licensed under the stat-
utory scheme, and the veterans, an unlimited number of book,
magazine, or newspaper sellers may occupy New York City side-
walks.  The New York Times has called this last category “First
Amendment vendors,” because they claim a constitutional right to
sell.60  In 1993, the City agreed to consider making a similar excep-
tion for vendors of visual art,61 or to alter its licensing system to
address the concerns of artists, but ultimately decided against any
change.62
It is unsurprising that New York City felt less than compelled to
offer protection to visual art commensurate to that given to books
and newspapers.  The state of the law on the protectability of visual
“speech” is far from clear.  In 1991, Professor Barbara Hoffman
wrote that “it is doubtful that anyone seriously contests the pro-
position that an artist’s work (of almost any medium) is sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of
the First Amendment.”63  Yet she concluded that, to the courts, ar-
tistic expression qualified for full First Amendment protection only
when the artist was expressing a clear political message, or was
57. N.Y.C. Code § 20-465 (2005).
58. N.Y.C. Local Law 33/1982; N.Y.C. Code § 20-453 (“[I]t shall be lawful for a
general vendor who hawks, peddles, sells or offers to sell, at retail, only newspapers,
periodicals, books, pamphlets or other similar written matter, but no other items re-
quired to be licensed by any other provision of this code, to vend such without ob-
taining a license therefore.”)
59. See Kernberg, supra note 56, at 165 (arguing, pre-Bery, for an extension of R
unlicensed vending rights to visual artists).
60. Lueck, supra note 34, at B1. R
61. Id.
62. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 101 (2d Cir. 2006)
63. Barbara Hoffman, Law for Art’s Sake in the Public Realm, 16 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 39, 60 (1991).
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touching on a matter of “public concern.”64  In 1970, the First Cir-
cuit permitted a state university to censor exhibition of work by
artist Chuck Close, because it found Close’s First Amendment
rights “minimal” in light of the work’s lack of political expression.65
Artwork has often been analogized to or categorized with con-
duct, rather than speech, for First Amendment purposes.  In Hur-
ley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
the Supreme Court united the idea of protecting parades with the
protection of visual art, music, and literature under the rubric of
“symbolism.”66
The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited
to its banners and songs, however, for the Constitution looks
beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression.
Noting that symbolism is a primitive but effective way of com-
municating ideas, our cases have recognized that the First
Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to
do so), wearing an armband to protest a war, displaying a red
flag, and even marching, walking or parading in uniforms dis-
playing the swastika.  As some of these examples show, a nar-
row, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions con-
veying a particularized message, would never reach the unques-
tionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Scho¨enberg [sic], or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.67
This statement by the Court suggests a clear, indeed “unques-
tionable” protection for apolitical artworks, but offers no further
guidance.  Some courts have understood Hurley to eliminate any
requirement of a “particularized message” to make a finding of ex-
pressiveness, but the Second Circuit is not one of them.68 Hurley
also raises theoretical questions about the rationale for protection,
which have yet to be fully answered.
64. Id. at 61-62 (synthesizing an analysis of Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974), and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).  Such constrained protection for
visual art is in accordance with the troubled “political speech” doctrine of the First
Amendment, favored by former judge Robert Bork. See generally Robert Bork, Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971)
65. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir. 1970).
66. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
67. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
68. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(citing Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 158-61 (3d Cir.
2002)).
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The Supreme Court often discusses questions on the freedom of
speech in terms of protecting a “marketplace of ideas.”69  This
“marketplace” model posits that speakers should be free from gov-
ernment control or censorship, so that truth and falsehood may
battle it out in public discourse.70  The value of literature in the
marketplace stems from its persuasive or analytic capabilities with
respect to a particular idea or point of view.71  The protection of
expression is limited to an audience’s ability to understand or as-
similate the underlying idea.72  The marketplace of ideas doctrine is
more or less compatible with protection of visual expression that
privileges political art, but Hurley suggests that no particularized
message, let alone a political one, is required for protection.73
Even Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, an original exponent of the
marketplace theory, said, “the people do need novels and dramas
and paintings and poems, because they will be called upon to
vote.”74  Furthermore, as Professor Hoffman points out, “catego-
rizing artistic expression as non-political or political is itself the
product of political and ideological choices.”75
An alternative to the marketplace model is “liberty” theory,
which holds that free speech should protect an “arena of individual
liberty” from state interference, not to foster or enrich public de-
bate, but because the protected speech or conduct fosters individ-
ual self-determination.76  In this model, no delineation between
“speech” and “conduct” is necessary, because either could serve
69. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 7; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, R
630 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.”).
70. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 4 (referring to John Stuart Mill’s defense of the R
model in his classic work On Liberty).
71. Id. at 9.
72. Hoffman, supra note 63, at 65. R
73. See Mastrovincenzo, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (“[I]f Pollock’s ‘Lavender Mist’
conveys a particularized message that is likely to be understood by the viewer, it is
difficult to conceive of many works of art that would fail that test.  To this extent, the
expressiveness test for conduct is perhaps somewhat ill-suited to determine the ex-
pressive quality of art.”).
74. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 263.
75. Hoffman, supra note 63, at 66; see also Redish, supra note 21, at 606-07. R
76. BAKER, supra note 4, at 5. R
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ305.txt unknown Seq: 12 10-SEP-07 13:17
1060 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
the same value to the individual making the expression.77  Broadly
speaking, liberty theory would afford greater protection to works
of visual expression because it would eliminate the need for a par-
ticularized analysis of the artist’s message, focusing instead on the
function of the expression with regard to the artist’s assertion of
self in cultural space or other “extrarational value[s].”78  As Profes-
sor Redish has theorized, free expression fosters the instrumental
values of democracy directly by allowing individuals to develop
their intellectual and emotive faculties, and facilitates individual
self-rule.79
Beyond questions of First Amendment theory, an additional bar-
rier to affording art protection from regulations like the GVL is
judicial reticence to deal with questions of aesthetics.80  A common
rationale is that law is all about objectivity and stability, while art is
hopelessly subjective and pliable.81  Yet, many areas of American
law require the law to make visual aesthetic determinations, such
as the doctrine of useful articles,82 moral rights in copyright,83 cus-
77. Id.
78. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 110 (1996) (arguing that
protecting art with a liberty-reinforcing First Amendment theory is a boon to
democracy).
79. Redish, supra note 21, at 604. R
80. See generally Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005)
(contrasting the judicial “doctrine of avoidance” in questions of artistic merit with
numerous examples of judges making those very determinations).  The “doctrine of
avoidance” can be traced back to Justice Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-51 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertak-
ing for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
work of pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).  This
discomfort is not limited to the highest echelons of legal scholarship; the city leaders
responsible for crafting and enforcing vending regulations do not want to implicate
themselves in aesthetic decision-making.  In Los Angeles, one assistant city attorney
has said that because of the impracticability of the law defining “art” or “creativity,”
the legislature is better “staying away.” See Kernberg, supra note 56, at 163.
81. See Farley, supra note 80, at 811-814; see also Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. R
2d 340, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Courts should not be asked to draw arbitrary lines
between what may be art and what may be prosaic as the touchstone of First Amend-
ment protection.”); Richard Posner, Art for Law’s Sake, 58 AM. SCHOLAR 513, 514
(1989) (“[W]hile it is possible to make objective measurements of physical properties
such as weight and speed, it is not possible to make such measurements of artistic
value, because people having different values and preferences do not agree and can-
not be brought to agree on how to determine the presence of that attribute and even
how to define it.”).
82. See Brandir Int’l  v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir.
1987).
83. See Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
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toms,84 arts funding,85 and urban planning,86 as well as First
Amendment jurisprudence.87  While many laws seek to promote
the arts, assuming they are “intrinsically valuable,” there is no sub-
stantial judicial discourse on why art ought to be protected.88  Be-
cause courts are loathe to engage in aesthetic scholarship,89 the
issue is often objectified.90
For these reasons, the question of whether or not people should
be arrested for selling their art on the sidewalk in New York City is
important, beyond the effect the answer has on any given individ-
ual.  It may affect whether the marketplace model becomes more
entrenched and self-referential, or whether the ability and liberty
of individuals to participate in the creation of culture—and expand
the scope of their citizenship—are reinforced.  An answer to the
question could serve as precedent for delineating the scope of pro-
tected expression wherever it arises, not just on sidewalks.  And it
gives us some idea of the willingness of courts to confront intellec-
tual matters on their own terms, rather than homogenizing every-
thing for the convenience of legal reasoning.
In the following section, this Comment will describe how the fed-
eral courts of the Second Circuit have dealt with the First Amend-
ment issues raised by the street vending of artistically expressive
merchandise in three specific cases: Bery v. City of New York in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Mastrovincenzo v. City of New
York in the Southern District of New York, and the Mas-
trovincenzo case on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
A. Bery v. City of New York
In July of 1993, artist Robert Bery was arrested by an under-
cover police officer for violating the GVL by selling his “forest se-
84. See Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428, 428-29 (Cust. Ct. 1928)
85. See The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 952(b) (West 2007).
86. See The Public Health and Welfare, Neighborhood and City Reinvestment,
Self-Help and Revitalization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8143(1) (West 2007).
87. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (establishing the standard
for obscenity as work without serious artistic value).
88. Farley, supra note 80, at 810. R
89. Id. at 839; see Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 192 S.E. 291, 293
(W. Va. 1937) (referring to aesthetics as “entirely speculative”).
90. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 292 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (analyzing object for “elements of expression or communication that objec-
tively could be so understood”).
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ries” paintings on the street.91  The pictures were confiscated.92  A
year later, Bery was joined by a number of painters, photogra-
phers, sculptors, and an artists’ advocacy organization, Artists for
Creative Expression on the Sidewalks of New York, in filing suit
against New York City to enjoin enforcement of the GVL against
them.93  The artists had been arrested or threatened with arrest for
displaying and selling their artistic wares in the City’s public spaces
without licenses.94  The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion,
and ruled that the GVL was a valid, content-neutral ordinance of
general application that did not violate the First Amendment, even
though it had the incidental effect of restricting the sale of art.95
The district court also concluded that words communicating “polit-
ical or religious views are much closer to the heartland of First
Amendment protection of ‘speech’ than the apolitical paintings in
these cases.”96
On de novo review, the Second Circuit reversed.97  First, the
court held that the appellant’s artwork was entitled to full First
Amendment protection.98  Noting that “[v]isual art is as wide rang-
ing in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book,
treatise, pamphlet or other writing,” the court went on to praise the
superlative communicative powers of imagery over words, which
“have the power to transcend . . . and reach beyond a particular
language group to both the educated and the illiterate.”99  The
court further noted that the artists’ street sales were part of their
expressive purpose, allowing any member of the public to consume
their work.100  The court found that unlike “the crafts of the jew-
eler, the potter and the silversmith,” whose work “may at times
91. Kernberg, supra note 56, at 158 (summarizing the facts of Mr. Bery’s arrest). R
92. Id.  The seventeen paintings confiscated by the police were generally reflective
of the artist’s “ecological concerns”; two of these also included quotations from the
Bible, while another included part of a letter by the artist Michelangelo. Id., citing
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, People v. Bery, No.
93N061526 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 15, 1993).  The inclusion of words or text in a work
of visual art has been a matter of some First Amendment significance in other juris-
dictions.  See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
93. Bery v. City of New York (Bery II), 97 F.3d 689, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1996).
94. Id. at 691.
95. Bery v. City of New York (Bery I), 906 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
96. Bery I, 906 F. Supp. at 169; see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. R
97. Bery II, 97 F.3d at 693.
98. Id. at 696.
99. Id. at 695; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632
(1943) (describing visual images as a “short cut from mind to mind”).
100. Bery II, 97 F.3d at 696.
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have expressive content, paintings, photographs, prints and sculp-
tures, such as those appellants seek to display and sell in public
areas of the City, always communicate some idea or concept to
those who view it, and as such are entitled to First Amendment
protection.”101
Second, the court applied the appropriate constitutional test to
the GVL.102  The court expressed doubt as to whether the GVL
was truly content-neutral, because it distinguished between written
and visual materials in a way that “effectively bans one while sub-
jecting the other to a more limited form of regulation.”103  The
court reached no conclusions on that issue because it found that
the ordinance was insufficient even when measured against the less
restrictive yardstick used for content-neutral regulations: requiring
time, place, and manner regulations to be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and leaving open ample
alternative channels for communication.104  The court noted that
New York City already had time, place, and manner restrictions on
vendors that more directly addressed concerns of crowd manage-
ment, congestion, and clear passage for the public on city thor-
oughfares, without implicating free speech.105  Additionally, the
court found the City’s exceptions for veterans and vendors of writ-
ten materials made the City’s argument for narrow tailoring appear
dubious.106
The City asserted that the vendors had any number of alterna-
tive channels for their expression, such as selling their work from
their homes, displaying it in restaurants and street fairs, or exhibit-
ing in galleries.107  The court disagreed, finding no adequate alter-
nate channels existed, because “[d]isplaying art on the street has a
different expressive purpose than gallery or museum shows; it
reaches people . . . who might feel excluded or alienated from these
forums.”108  Emphatically stating that the sidewalks must be availa-
ble for the artists to reach their audience, the court held that the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 697.
105. Id. at 698; see N.Y.C. Code § 20-465 (2005); see also supra note 57 and accom- R
panying text.
106. Bery II, 97 F.3d at 698.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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GVL was an unconstitutional infringement of the appellants’ First
Amendment rights.109
Instead of contesting this ruling at a trial on the merits or revis-
ing the substance of the GVL, the City of New York consented to a
permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement of § 20-453
against any person who “hawks, peddles, sells, leases or offers to
sell or lease, at retail, any paintings, photographs, prints and/or
sculpture, either exclusively or in conjunction with newspapers, pe-
riodicals, books, pamphlets or other similar written matter, in a
public space.”110
B. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York
In 2004, two freelance artists brought a challenge to New York
City under Bery and the Bery injunction.111  Christopher Mas-
trovincenzo and Kevin Santos were at the time of the litigation
working in a graffiti style, which they described as “a highly styl-
ized form of typography.”112  The plaintiffs worked on the streets
painting articles of clothing, offering both original designs and cus-
tom-painted pieces, with the price varying in accordance with the
complexity of the design.113  Some works contained text, logos, de-
signs, or images of public figures, such as President Bush.114
Neither plaintiff had a vending license, and both were denied per-
mission from the City to sell their works without one.115  Mas-
trovincenzo was arrested twice for selling without a license; Santos
was not arrested, but was ordered by police to close up his
display.116
Mastrovincenzo and Santos sued the City in federal court, alleg-
ing inter alia that enforcement of the licensing requirement vio-
lated the Bery injunction and the First Amendment.117  The City
109. Id.
110. Permanent Injunction on Consent dated Oct. 21, 1997, Bery v. City of New
York, No. 94 Civ. 4253 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Bery Injunction].
111. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York (Mastrovincenzo I), 313 F. Supp. 2d
280 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
112. Id. at 284.
113. Id.
114. Id. Both the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that the plaintiffs’ work contained depictions of President Bush, but
neither opinion assigned any political significance to the imagery.  A more detailed
description of the presidential motif might have shed much needed light on, or raised
additional questions about, the courts’ First Amendment analysis. Id. at 291-94.
115. Id. at 284.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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responded that the artists’ work was not sufficiently expressive or
communicative to distinguish it from any other decorative, “regu-
lar” wares.118  The Southern District framed the issue as “whether
the items Plaintiffs offer for sale are expressive merchandise.”119
“The case at bar requires the Court to explore the frontiers of Bery
to delineate a border between protected, expressive art and unpro-
tected, non-expressive merchandise.”120
The district court mused at length on the right way to determine
the expressiveness of the plaintiffs’ work.121  The court quickly dis-
missed any notion that the protection should be restricted to works
embodied by traditional means:
[T]he I-know-it-when-I-see-it test . . . may be easily dispatched.
Should it be a prerequisite for art to be art, that the artist ex-
press his thoughts through traditional, perceptually accessible
means?  The long history of ideas, which records infamous in-
stances of persecution of creative expression, would answer
compellingly, for any society that values free speech as much as
ours, with an emphatic “No.”122
Unlike paintings, photographs, prints, and sculptures, which
would receive “blanket protection” from the courts, items like
those offered by Mastrovincenzo and Santos would necessitate an
individuated evaluation of their expressive qualities.123  In the end,
content should trump form, because “[w]hat Plaintiffs paint, not
what they paint on, determines whether their work is sufficiently
expressive to merit First Amendment protection.”124  The applica-
ble factors were “myriad,” including the artists’ given reason for
creating the item, the individual creation of the item by the artist,
the artist’s “bona fides” as such, whether or not the artist was con-
veying his own message through the item, and whether the item
appeared to contain elements of expression that “objectively could
be so understood.”125  After examining the plaintiffs’ work, the
118. Id. at 285.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 286.
121. Id. at 292.
122. Id. at 289.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 292 (citing Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that the message-bearing t-shirt was to its peddler “what the New York Times
is to the Sulzbergers and the Oschses—the vehicle of her ideas and opinions.”)).
125. See id.  The court here was grappling with what I will call the problem of
craftsmanship: there is a desire to privilege works that are individually or “hand”
made, both as reward for the artist’s “sweat of the brow” and because of the credence
many people give to the artist’s signature mark as signifier of quality or aesthetic
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court found that the items were “as expressive as any sidewalk cal-
ligrapher or Chinese-character painter, apparently neither of
whom needs a license from the [City] to produce and sell their
wares.”126  The court determined that the artists’ wares were suffi-
ciently expressive to trigger First Amendment protection, but went
on to hold that the work would be covered by the Bery injunction
even if it had no expressive function.127  Noting that the Bery in-
junction made no mention of expressiveness, nor provided any def-
inition of “painting, photograph, print, or sculpture,” the court
blamed the City for the philosophical and practical difficulties Bery
presented.128  The court was satisfied that with time, case law
would accumulate to instruct the City as to what types of merchan-
dise were and were not suitable for licensing, and that the burden
of litigating such cases would not become unmanageable.129
New York City appealed the grant of a preliminary injunction
barring it from enforcing GVL § 20-453 against Mastrovincenzo
and Santos, arguing that the artists’ merchandise did not constitute
“paintings” within the meaning of the Bery injunction, or protected
expression under the First Amendment.130  Whereas the district
court examined the expressive capacity of the works before deter-
mining whether or not they fit within the scope of the Bery injunc-
tion,131 the Second Circuit began its analysis with the opposite
conclusion: “[w]here, as in the instant case, items do not fall within
one of these four categories [paintings, photographs, prints or
sculpture], their sale must be classified as potentially expressive.”132
The Second Circuit applauded the district court’s focus on examin-
ing the contested items themselves for expressive content, as op-
posed to consulting the creator, but ultimately dispensed with its
multi-pronged test.133  Specifically, the consideration of whether
the work might have “any expressive or communicative elements”
value.  Individuated manufacture is one way to distinguish “art” from, say, the deco-
ration on the back of playing cards. See People v. Saul, 776 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191-93
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). On the other hand, the court doesn’t want to accidentally pro-
tect non-expressive craft-items that are mere “regular merchandise.”  Bery v. City of
New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996).
126. Mastrovincenzo I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
127. Id. at 293-94.
128. Id. at 293.
129. Id. at 294.
130. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York (Mastrovincenzo II), 435 F.3d 78, 88 (2d
Cir. 2006).
131. See Mastrovincenzo I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 290-93.
132. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 93.
133. Id. at 94.
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would permit over-inclusive protection and “interesting and crea-
tive, but ultimately absurd intellectual exercises.”134
Instead, the court laid out a new methodology.  First, a court
should look for evidence that a work contains any expressive ele-
ments.135  If so, the court should then determine whether the item
also has a common non-expressive purpose, and if this is also true,
then it is likely to possess “only marginally expressive content.”136
If the court finds both expressive content and utility, it must bal-
ance the two and conclude whether or not the item is a mere com-
mercial good outside the scope of the First Amendment.137
Applying this framework to the plaintiffs’ graffiti-decorated items,
the court held them to be “predominantly expressive.”138  This
finding was, in turn, only one strong indication that the plaintiffs
were engaged in protected speech; the court also considered the
artists’ stated motivations for selling their work, and whether the
sale of goods was “an act of self expression.”139  The Second Circuit
expressly rejected the district court’s consideration of the artists’
“bona fides,” because of the “potentially undesirable effects of
such an inquiry.”140
Having found Santos’s and Mastrovincenzo’s work within the ae-
gis of the First Amendment, the Second Circuit examined the
GVL.  The court found the GVL to be content-neutral: “[t]he mere
fact that New York City differentiates between categories of ven-
dors—that is, vendors of written materials, paintings, photographs,
prints and sculptures are exempt from its licensing requirement
while other vendors are not—does not suggest that the City’s regu-
lation targets particular messages and favors others.”141
That said, the Second Circuit held that § 20-453 survived inter-
mediate scrutiny because it is a valid time-place-manner restriction,
narrowly tailored and leaving ample alternative channels for regu-
lated communications, even though it does not serve as the least
speech-restrictive regulation possible.142  Narrow tailoring was sat-
134. Id. at 94-95.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 95.  But see Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d
1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance protecting only
goods with no intrinsic value other than expression).
137. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 95.
138. Id. at 96.
139. Id. at 97.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 99 (finding that the City’s licensing requirement “applies across the
board to all non-exempt vendors”).
142. Id. at 102.
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isfied by the New York City Council’s determination that a fixed
license scheme, like the GVL, alleviated congestion of city side-
walks.143  The court found no evidence that the fixed-licensing was
surplus in relation to the other time-place-manner restrictions
aimed at reducing congestion by governing the square footage ven-
dors could occupy, or which sidewalks would be available to vend-
ing.144  As for the availability of alternative channels, the court
opined that the plaintiffs were free to put their name on the wait-
ing list for a general vendors license, or to lobby the City Council
to change the regulatory scheme, even though either course, in
light of past experience, would almost certainly fail.145  The plain-
tiffs were also told they were at liberty to give their work away for
free.146  The court distinguished Bery’s holding in terms of tailor-
ing, finding that the artistic wares for sale in that case were of an
altogether different form.147  Reversing the district court’s First
Amendment determination, the Second Circuit used the listing of
media from the Bery injunction to circumscribe the scope of consti-
tutional protection:
[t]he types of wares at issue here, whose dominant purpose is
not clearly expressive, present line-drawing questions markedly
distinct from the more-easily-classified “paintings, photographs,
prints and/or sculpture” at issue in Bery, and we are therefore
persuaded that the least restrictive or ‘least intrusive means of
achieving the stated governmental interest’ . . . in this context is
likely to be more burdensome than it would be with respect to
the traditional art forms at issue in Bery.148
The Second Circuit also overturned the district court’s determi-
nation on independent and adequate grounds that the plaintiffs’
painted hats were “paintings” within the meaning of the Bery in-
143. Id. at 100 (citing N.Y.C. Local Law 50/1979 § 1).
144. Id.; contra Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 698 (2d Cir. 1996).
145. See Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 100.  The court suggested that the City
Council was not beyond persuasion to raise the number of permits, because it had
discussed alternative licensing schemes at a hearing in 1993. See id.  But see Hicks,
supra note 49 (“‘The waiting list has been closed for several years,’ said Patricia B. R
Cohen, a spokeswoman for the Department of Consumer Affairs.  ‘And there is really
very little turnover.’”).
146. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 101 (“Notwithstanding New York City’s licens-
ing requirement, plaintiffs may personally distribute their art to the public free of
charge . . . [a]t most, therefore, § 20-453 prohibits plaintiffs, as unlicensed vendors,
from personally selling their wares for a profit and at a venue of their choosing.”). But
see Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1997).
147. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 102.
148. Id. at 102.
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junction.149  The court’s determined that “[n]otwithstanding the ex-
istence of a dictionary definition to the contrary, ‘paintings’, as it
is . . . understood in common parlance, refers . . . only and specifi-
cally to painted canvases.”150  To find otherwise, the court decided,
would allow the City’s exception for artwork to swallow its licens-
ing rule, and would be contrary to the intentions of the parties to
the injunction.151  In review, the Second Circuit opined that the dis-
trict court could not have itself believed the plaintiffs’ work to be
“paintings,” because such a finding would have eliminated the ne-
cessity of performing First Amendment analysis.152
In a partial dissent, Judge Sack questioned the court’s insistence
that a hand-painted hat could not be a “painting.”153  Analogizing
to another example of art in public space, Judge Sack doubted that
certain Renaissance frescos would be considered any less great
artworks because they appeared on utilitarian parts of buildings.154
More immediately, he questioned why the plaintiffs’ creations
would be any less “paintings” within the meaning of Bery than “the
endless, mass-produced ‘prints,’ the dissemination of which is now
exempt from the City’s licensing requirement.”155  Looking behind
the quick listing of the Bery injunction itself, the dissent noted that
the injunction was entered into after the Second Circuit staked out
an expansive new swath of entitled expression, offering that the
injunction should be read in light of the litigation informing it.156
All told, the approach applied by the Second Circuit in the Bery
and Mastrovincenzo cases has its advantages: it distinguishes what
kinds of wares require analysis of their expressivity, gives some
guidelines on conducting such analysis, and does not define an art-
ist by her tutelage.157  It strikes a blow for objectivity, if not sim-
plicity, and gives great deference to the City in its role as arbiter of
public space.  The court, of course, is no foe of art, per se.  There
are a number of problems, however, with what the Second Circuit
has created in this area.
149. Id. at 102-03.
150. Id. at 104.  Plaintiffs offered a definition of “painting” as “something produced
through the process or art of painting.” Id.; see WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1621 (2002).
151. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 104 (citing World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 184 (2d Cir. 2003)).
152. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 105.
153. Id. at 107 (Sack, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 107-08.
155. Id. at 108.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 135-52 and accompanying text. R
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The Bery court did not exaggerate when it acknowledged in its
opinion the unavoidable difficulty posed by its ruling.158  Yet, in
concluding that the artist-plaintiffs were entitled to protection, the
court proclaimed it would all be worth it: “difficulty does not war-
rant placing all visual expression in limbo outside the reach of the
First Amendment’s protective arm.  Courts have struggled with
such issues in the past; that is not to say that decisions are impossi-
ble.”159  This is cold comfort looking back at the legal landscape
constructed by the decision, where the four media ennobled as al-
ways communicating an idea or concept have been laid down as an
exclusive listing.160  The Bery court’s holding, in that regard, is con-
fusing because it seems radically and arbitrarily to narrow the ap-
plication of the precedents cited on the matter of expression.  The
court chided the City for its “myopic” view of “the essence of vis-
ual communication,” and discussed the reciprocal enrichment of
text and image, claiming, “the two cannot always be readily distin-
guished.”161  Yet the court’s focus on expression is absent from its
holding; it was willing to discuss the communicative validity of vis-
ual things but not to provide real guidance for artists and politi-
cians going forward.
The resulting injunction is both under- and over-inclusive.162
First, the Bery injunction makes no mention of drawings in its list-
ing, even though drawing is a traditional mechanism of visual rep-
resentation,163 often a foundational step for painting, sculpture,
and printmaking, and practiced extensively by art vendors in New
York City.164  The Bery injunction makes no exception for collage
or any number of other media with reassuringly historical pedi-
grees of artistic expression.165  Yet the injunction is used to protect
158. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996).
159. Id.
160. See Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 103-04 (majority opinion) (discussing Bery
Injunction, supra note 110). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the inclusion of one
is the exclusion of the other.
161. Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
162. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York (Mastrovincenzo I ), 313 F. Supp. 2d
280, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing Bery as “arguably at once too broad and too
narrow”).
163. See generally BETTY EDWARDS, DRAWING ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BRAIN
(1989).
164. See Lueck, supra note 34 (describing vendors of “$5 portraits” as a problem in R
crowded Times Square).
165. See Mastrovincenzo I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (citing Bery Injunction, supra
note 110).  For a listing of categories of media permitted for vending and display by
San Francisco’s Arts Commission, including drawing, castings, computer-generated
art, enameling, and engraving, see Kernberg, supra note 56, at 180. R
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any vendor selling mass-produced pictures of celebrities or photo-
graphs of landmarks, as well as “any sidewalk calligrapher or Chi-
nese-character painter.”166 Bery effectively removed expressivity
from the analysis of paintings, photographs, prints, and sculpture,
even as it vaunted the expressive potential of those media.167  Cen-
turies of aesthetic scholarship and discourse are flattened to a legal
presumption.168
The Second Circuit in Mastrovincenzo was limited in what it
could do with Bery as binding precedent.169  The test it created to
separate expressive art from merchandise is unwieldy, however,
despite the court’s attempt to make it “as straightforward as we can
devise.”170  The first step, looking for a utilitarian function of the
item and balancing that function against its expressive uses, jumps
ahead of itself.  In order to weigh the functional and the expressive,
the court must first make a measure of expressiveness based
strictly on its observations.  In Mastrovincenzo, the court placed its
faith more in its “objective” examination of the contested items,
and less in other factors, such as the vendors’ expressed motives.171
But ultimately, the court went through the motions of taking those
factors into account anyway, and concluded that the First Amend-
ment protected the plaintiffs’ work.172  By this process the court
carved out a new category for the plaintiffs’ work: short of “expres-
sion,” but not purely based on merchandise, it is only “predomi-
nantly expressive.”173  An item’s classification in this category
entitles it to some First Amendment protection, just not as much as
166. Mastrovincenzo I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 291; see also Lueck, supra note 34. R
167. See White v. City of Sparks, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138-39 (D. Nev. 2004).
168. I am presumptuously pegging the starting point of this scholarship and dis-
course with IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (1790).
169. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York (Mastrovincenzo II ), 435 F.3d 78, 93
(2d Cir. 2006).
170. Id. at 95.
171. Id. at 95-97.  The court also completely rejected any “pernicious” inquiry into
the artist’s training as such. Id.  The court is apparently comfortable with the idea of
conducting an “objective” inquiry into whether or not an item has expressive ele-
ments, id. at 91, but identifies the need for judicial sagacity to avoid “absurd” results
in practice. Id. at 95. See Farley, supra note 80, at 832-36 (describing how “courts’ R
high ambitions towards aesthetic relativism easily give way to subjective aesthetic
determinations”).
172. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 96.  This was despite the court’s finding that the
artists’ hats could also be used for “calming and controlling unruly hair.” Id.
173. Id. at 85.  For a discussion of the difficulties in making a similar determination
in the right of publicity context, see Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion
in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
471, 488-89 (2003).
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that enjoyed by fully expressive things, like paintings.174  If an artist
thinks her work falls into this interpretive crevasse, the rest of the
Mastrovincenzo order will offer little guidance for how to proceed.
This hierarchical relationship between visual expression and
goods both expressive and utilitarian is also, arguably, impermissi-
bly based on content.  The Supreme Court has said that time-place-
manner restrictions are only valid “provided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech . . . .”175
The Second Circuit in Mastrovincenzo distinguished the plaintiffs’
wares as those of which a “dominant purpose is not clearly expres-
sive,” from “the more-easily-classified” artworks in Bery.176  A dis-
tinction with such significance to litigants seeking constitutional
safe harbor should arguably not be based on the courts’ facility in
making clear sense of an item’s content.177  If the medium is—in
whole or in part—the message, the law’s preference between me-
dia may be construed as something of a constraint on content.
Finally, the presumptive protection of these works is based on
the understanding that paintings transmit concrete ideas or con-
cepts to viewers,178 and thus places the emphasis on the reception
of the audience, rather than on the expressive faculties of the artist.
The road taken by the courts of the Ninth Circuit avoids many of
the practical problems of the Second Circuit, but shares this last
conceptual difficulty: discerning when a visually expressive work
communicates an idea, and drawing a line at the level of abstrac-
tion permissible to determine the grant of protection.
III. THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
APPROACH TO DEFINING PROTECTED
VISUAL EXPRESSION
A. White v. City of Sparks
In 2004, an artist named Steven White sued the city of Sparks,
Nevada, alleging that the Sparks Municipal Code prohibited him
from selling his paintings on the city’s streets and parks without a
license in violation of his First Amendment rights.179  White prac-
174. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 102.
175. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
176. Mastrovincenzo II, 435 F.3d at 102.
177. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995).
178. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996).
179. White v. City of Sparks, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Nev. 2004); see also
Sparks Municipal Code §§ 5.59.010 to 5.59.160 (2007), available at http://www.ci.
sparks.nv.us/governing/muni_code/Title_5/59/index.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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ticed his art by working in public areas and selling paintings to
passersby.180  The City of Sparks’s policy on street vending gener-
ally prohibited the sale of goods in parks and other areas desig-
nated as public facilities, but defined “goods” only as merchandise
not protected as speech under the First Amendment.181  An artist,
like White, who wished to sell art in these areas was required to
seek a determination by the city’s staff that his work constituted
protected speech; the staff in turn was instructed to get a legal
opinion before making a determination.182  The City evaluated
whether or not the work was protected speech based on whether it
“present[ed] . . . a religious, political, philosophical or ideological
message . . . based on common sense and the plain meanings of the
four categories.”183
The plaintiff encouraged the court to adopt the Bery court’s
holding that visual art, at least art manifested as “painting,” is per
se entitled to First Amendment protection because it is inherently
expressive.184  The court rejected this interpretation: “[a]pplying
such a blanket presumption of protected status would . . . be out of
step with Ninth Circuit precedent and the First Amendment’s fun-
damental purpose—to protect expression.”185  The court cited the
Southern District of New York’s opinion in Mastrovincenzo with
approval.186  The City of Sparks argued that art must adhere tightly
to one of the four categories to be protected.187  The court denied
the City’s interpretation and reiterated the Ninth Circuit’s stan-
dard: that merchandise must “carry or constitute a political, relig-
ious, philosophical or ideological message in order to merit First
Amendment protection . . . read broadly to encompass both ex-
plicit, understandable messages and implicit, abstract expres-
sion.”188  Ultimately, the court agreed with the Bery court’s
180. White, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
181. Id. at 1137.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir.
2003).
184. White, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (citing Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689,
696 (2d Cir. 1996)).
185. Id. at 1139.
186. Id. (citing Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
187. Id.  In a footnote within its opposition papers, the City of Sparks noted that
the plaintiff’s paintings did not include “potentially protected symbols such as white
buffalo and Indian faces,” elements which presumably would have made the City
more amenable to their sale in the parks. Id.
188. Id. at 1140.  The court suggested that if the work of artist Jackson Pollock
could fit within this standard, it would be difficult for many works of art not to. Id.
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acknowledgement of a distinction between art and merchandise for
protection purposes, but disapproved of its imprecision.189
B. The Ninth Circuit and “Expressive Merchandise”
The district court in White drew upon the Ninth Circuit’s test for
protected expression, which does not apply only to visual art.  The
Ninth Circuit has chosen to enumerate types of messages, rather
than methods of expression, that are worthy of First Amendment
protection.190
The Ninth Circuit has had occasion to pass judgment on the suit-
ability of vending regulations with respect to “expressive merchan-
dise” as one of these categories.  In 1990, a group of nonprofit
organizations won a challenge to San Francisco’s peddling ordi-
nance, which prohibited the unlicensed vending of any goods
“other than books, pamphlets, buttons, bumperstickers [sic], pos-
ters, or items that have no intrinsic value other than to communi-
cate a message.”191  The regulation failed primarily because it acted
as a prior restraint on speech,192 but was also criticized for charging
exorbitant fees and because it made “few, if any, permits presently
available to anyone.”193  Most importantly for purposes of this
analysis, the court dismissed the City’s rationale that First Amend-
ment protection only applies to items with “pure communicative
value,” and waved off the conclusion that the sale of merchandise
not up to such a standard would automatically be considered a
lowly commercial transaction.194  Instead, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the merchandise they wished to sell was fully pro-
tected under the First Amendment, because it conveyed “core”
First Amendment messages.195
Jackson Pollock is a useful touchstone; the Supreme Court has described his work as
“unquestionably shielded.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
189. White, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-40.
190. See A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003);
Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1997); One World One Fam-
ily Now v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaudiya
Vaishnava Soc’y v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990).
191. Gaudiya, 952 F.2d at 1061.  The plaintiffs were unable to acquire permits in
part because permits were only issued to natural persons.  Applicants for permits
were required to pay a non-refundable $300 fee, and an annual permit tax. Id.
192. Id. at 1062.  New York City’s ordinance does not suffer this particular defi-
ciency, because all discretion in the awarding of permits has been stripped by statute.
See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1996).
193. Guadiya, 952 F.2d at 1061 n.3.
194. Id. at 1063.
195. Id.
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So, like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged
that a range of things, not just books or newspapers, may be con-
sidered expressive merchandise for First Amendment purposes.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has not expressed concern about
any additional instrumentality that expressive merchandise may
have.  The Ninth Circuit has obviously focused more on the mes-
sage than the medium.  Specifically refusing to adopt the logic of
Bery, the District Court for the District of Nevada has re-affirmed
its allegiance to a purely message-based theory of the First Amend-
ment.196  From the artist’s point of view, this is a mixed bag.  While
the White court was clear that the Ninth Circuit test would be
broad enough to cover any work of art that could be implicitly read
with an abstract philosophical, religious, ideological, or political
message, the court’s interpretation still relies on the discernment of
some message by the government to win entitlement.  Unlike the
Second Circuit, which only requires artists to work in certain time-
tested media to get protection, the Ninth Circuit allows artists to
gamble on the aesthetic faculties of the courts.  This, of course, re-
quires the kind of intimate dance between artistic and legal judg-
ments that judges often dread or bungle.197  The White court cited
Hurley for support, finding that the City of Sparks’s policy came
too close to requiring a “particularized message.”198  Yet, even at
their most abstract and implicit, artworks must still have a message
cognizably particular to one of the four categories to merit
protection.
IV. OTHER DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
In 2004, the City of New Orleans charged an artist, Marc
Tre´bert, with a criminal misdemeanor for selling his artwork in
Jackson Square.199  Tre´bert held a city permit to vend artwork in
the “Jackson Square set-up area,” and relied upon it in selling his
digital photographs, which he embellished with pastels.200  The
New Orleans Municipal Code provides that artists may sell only
“original” art in that area of Jackson Square; Tre´bert’s work was
considered insufficiently original because he relied on a “mechani-
196. White v. City of Sparks, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (D. Nev. 2004).
197. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. R
198. White, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
199. Tre´bert v. City of New Orleans, 2005 WL 273253, *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2005).
200. Id. at *1-2.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ305.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-SEP-07 13:17
1076 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
cal or duplicative process” to create it, namely photography.201
The City argued that Tre´bert’s work fell outside the scope of the
First Amendment because it was not expressive “art.”202  The Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, however, found
that the City misunderstood the issue: “[t]he question is not
whether plaintiff’s work is art, but whether it is ‘speech.’”203  The
court quickly found that Tre´bert’s work was protected speech and
granted his summary judgment motion.204
While the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide
the scope of protected expression for artwork, the Middle District
of Florida has held that visual art incorporating elements of written
expression is per se protected by the First Amendment.205  Only a
few months before the Second Circuit’s ruling in Mastrovincenzo,
the Southern District of New York issued an opinion permitting
painting “graffiti” on mock subway-car doors as expression pro-
tected under the First Amendment.206
What emerges from this patchwork of cases is that there is no
clear set of standards for what constitutes “speech” in the realm of
visual expression.  The tentative approach used in Florida is ap-
pealingly straightforward: so long as art has writing in it, it fits
within the scope of cases discussing the protection of writings.  Had
Mastrovincenzo and Santos created their works in Tampa, perhaps
they would have been able to reap the benefits of this interpreta-
tion, since their style of graffiti art is based on expressively stylized
201. Id. at *2.  In citing Tre´bert, the City of New Orleans reasoned that
“[p]reserving the distinctive charm, character and tout ensemble of the [French] Quar-
ter” was a significant governmental interest, and that Tre´bert’s work undermined said
qualities. Id.
202. Id. at *5.
203. See id. at *5, n.1 (suggesting the names of luminaries in the field of photogra-
phy, art institutions enshrining photography, and courses offered by Tulane Univer-
sity’s art department on photography, should the plaintiff ever need evidence that
photography is, in fact, an art form).
204. Id. at *11.
205. See Celli v. City of St. Augustine, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258-59 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (noting the Second Circuit’s holding in Bery but deciding the call on narrower
grounds); see also Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[A]ctual speech, as when written or spoken, is always communica-
tive or expressive and thus virtually always protected.”).  Were the plaintiffs in Mas-
trovincenzo creating their decorated hats in the Eleventh Circuit, their incorporation
of words within the work might have vaulted them above ambiguity. See supra note
92 and accompanying text.
206. See Ecko.Complex LLC v. Bloomberg, 382 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting that the city’s “heavy-handed censorship would, moreover, fall particu-
larly hard on artists, who frequently revel in breaking conventions or tweaking the
powers that be”).
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typography.207  In the case of photography, what struck the Second
Circuit as Platonically communicative208 was so offensive to the
City of New Orleans that it was willing to litigate in federal court
that it did not amount to art.209  The courts are struggling with a
way to sort visual expression from visual detritus, to avoid watering
down the First Amendment, but lament the incompatibility of legal
reasoning and aesthetic judgment.210
What the above-mentioned cases have in common is a focus on
the work’s receiving end—the work’s communicative clarity, its
medium, and the ease with which it can be analogized to text or
absorbed into the First Amendment’s protective pantheon by the
operation of historical convention.  The cases do not examine the
artist, her motives, the role that the work plays within the artist’s
life, or the lives of the artist’s intended audience (i.e., not the judi-
ciary).  The Second Circuit, in fact, has specifically downgraded the
role of the creator in its interpretive method.211  In the following
section, this Comment will argue that courts must turn their atten-
tion away from the questions of if and how contested works com-
municate messages, and instead protect artists’ public exhibition
rights under a “self realization” theory of free expression grounded
in the benefit that the expressive process confers on both the artist
and her audience.
V. REEVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF EXPRESSION
A. The Pursuit and Protection of Communicative
Value Is Fruitless
During the 1980s, lawyers fighting in the “culture wars”212 sought
to delineate the protections entitled to artists and their work in the
context of securing or withdrawing public funds from institutions
207. Mastrovincenzo,  313 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
208. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996).
209. Tre´bert, 2005 WL 273253 at *5.
210. Id.; see Mastrovincenzo, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 288; White v. City of Sparks, 341 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D. Nev. 2004); see also Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759
F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the First Amendment applies to “art for
art’s sake”); Farley, supra note 80, at 810-15; Posner, supra note 81, at 515. R
211. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).
212. See generally CULTURE WARS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECENT CONTROVER-
SIES IN THE ARTS (Richard Bolton ed. 1992).  For a very angry recounting of the
“culture wars” from the conservative perspective, see LYNNE MUNSON, EXHIBITION-
ISM: ART IN AN ERA OF INTOLERANCE (2001) (defending “eternal” aesthetic princi-
ples from revisionist art historians).
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like the embattled National Endowment for the Arts.213  Some-
times the issue was decency214 or obscenity.215  Other times, the
problem was that the public subjected to the work could not stand
living with it.216  These kinds of cases provide the least opportunity
to evade questions of aesthetic quality or substance, because the
public support of that quality or substance is what is at stake.217
While those sorts of issues are thankfully not at issue here, they
have further complicated any legal encounters with art issues.
Judges not inclined solely to reserve protection for traditionally
embodied expressive works218 may now throw up their hands at the
supposed arbitrariness of the whole inquiry.219  Perhaps if the law
took greater notice of the real and substantial body of scholarship
on these issues, the law would lose some of its aura of
impenetrability.220
In cases that turn on the regulation of displaying and selling vis-
ual expression in public fora, judicial notice will not fix everything.
Though artworks may be “texts” for semiotic purposes, there is no
good way to deal with silent visual expressions by analogizing to
the printed and spoken word.  When judges inquire into whether a
creator’s wares are sufficiently expressive to merit First Amend-
ment protection by considering whether “any elements of expres-
sion or communication . . . objectively could be so understood,”221
the judge undertakes the misguided task of trying to fix the com-
municative purpose of the work as if with a printer’s blocks.  When
a judge gives blanket protection based on the medium of represen-
213. See generally Jennifer Weatherup, Agencies and the Arts: The Dilemma of Sub-
sidizing Expression, 24 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 271 (2004).
214. See, e.g., N.E.A. v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998).
215. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Cincinnati v. Barri, 57 Ohio
Misc. 2d 9 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1990); see also Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and
the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990) (criticizing the Miller test for
obscenity in light of post-modern art practice); Farley, supra note 80, at 847 (pointing R
out that “[a]ny case in which a court must resolve whether an object is art or obscen-
ity necessarily employs the aesthetic theory of formalism”).
216. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 664 F. Supp. 798, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff’d, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988); Hoffman, supra note 63, at 85 (discussing the R
“captive audience” problem in the Serra case).
217. See Farley, supra note 80, at 831. R
218. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
219. See Posner, supra note 81, at 517 (“[A]rtistic value is largely, perhaps entirely, R
unknowable.”).
220. See Farley, supra note 80, at 853-54; see also David S. Caudill & Lewis H. R
LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know About the Social,
Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45
B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (claiming that judges should know “more about everything”).
221. Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 87-88.
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tation,222 she ducks the issue entirely, and dilutes the meaning the
protection is supposed to have.  And when a judge restricts protec-
tion to works with even-abstractly discernable “religious, political,
philosophical or ideological”223 messages, she sets herself up to
perpetuate the presentation of difficult cases.
Yet, many judges and scholars seem to feel completely confident
that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech ap-
plies to visual art and visual expression, despite its potential inartic-
ulateness.224  Too often these declarations of protection beg a
footnote.  The Supreme Court says that Jackson Pollock is “un-
questionably protected,” but never tells us why this is so.225
The conviction that visual expression belongs within the scope of
the First Amendment is correct, but it lacks for theorization.  When
a court, like the Second Circuit in Bery, does explain why a work of
visual expression merits special constitutional freedoms, it is for
the wrong reason.  The Bery court, like the White court, focused on
the communication of a message.  Both courts were obviously try-
ing to be sensitive to what they perceived as the dynamism of art
and the need to focus on the “essence” of artistic communication,
so that their rulings might apply to works old and new.226  The Bery
court went so far as to proclaim that “[t]he ideas and concepts em-
bodied in visual art have the power to transcend . . . language limi-
tations and reach beyond a particular language group to both the
222. Id. at 91.
223. Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1066 (9th
Cir. 1990); White v. City of Sparks, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1144 (D. Nev. 2004).
224. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (describing the non-representational work of Jackson Pollock as “un-
questionably protected”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“[P]aintings, photographs, prints and sculptures . . . are entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection.”); Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir.
1985) (“[T]he First Amendment has been interpreted to embrace purely artistic as
well as political expression.”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501 (1952) (protecting motion pictures that “may affect public attitudes and behavior
in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to
the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression”); David
Greene, Why Protect Political Art as “Political Speech”?, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 359, 362 (2005) (presenting as a certainty that visual art falls under the aegis of
the First Amendment); Meiklejohn, supra note 74, at 263 (“[T]he people do need . . . R
paintings.”); Redish, supra note 21, at 627 (“[I]t is highly doubtful that fine art, ballet R
or literature can be thought to aid one on making concrete life-affecting decisions, yet
all three seem deserving of full first amendment [sic] protection.”).
225. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569; see also Farley, supra note 80, at 838 (“Probably the R
most prevalent way that courts deal with the tension between needing to decide an
object’s art status, while at the same time being admonished not to do so, is simply to
reach a conclusion on that question without any supporting analysis.”).
226. Bery, 97 F.3d at 695; White, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
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educated and the illiterate.”227  Using this conception of art, one
might call it “speech-plus”—a visual language with universal com-
municative value.
The problem is that art is not “speech-plus.”  If works of visual
expression were true “shortcuts from mind to mind,” our only legal
contests over art would turn on the appropriateness of their distin-
guished meanings, not about whether or not a given object consti-
tutes expression or art.  It is the opaqueness of visual expression,
not its universality or transparency, that characterizes it with re-
gards to law and society.228  Positions staked out based on this be-
lief in universal or fixed communicative capacity in art owe much
to formalism, a school of thought that posits that through reference
to static, inherent aesthetic principles, works of art may become
objectively good.229  Formalism has been in decline in the academy
and in practice since the 1960s.230  Legal conflicts illustrate well the
impossibility of looking for fixed communicative value, even at the
most abstract levels, in works of visual expression.231
So long as courts support their conclusions about the First
Amendment’s protection of art by trying to nail down discrete
messages—even those broadly defined232—this unsatisfying state
of affairs will persist.  An artist cannot rely on judicial determina-
tions about the scope of her freedoms if those determinations de-
pend on a process balancing expression and utility, as in the
227. Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
228. See Hoffman, supra note 63, at 52-57; see also DEUTSCHE, supra note 43, at 62- R
63 (“[T]he notion that Tilted Arc bestows on the Federal Plaza an aesthetic use availa-
ble to all ignores questions recently posed in a multitude of disciplines about differ-
ences among users and, further, about the users’ role in producing the meanings of
their environments. . . .‘The situation of man confronting the city,’ writes Raymond
Ledrut, ‘involves other things than schemas of perceptive behavior.  It introduces ide-
ology.’”) (quoting RAYMOND LEDRUT, LES IMAGES DE LA VILLE 28 (1973)).
229. Formalism was ascendant in the early 20th Century and is most often associ-
ated with the art critic Clement Greenberg.  For a theorization of the objectivity of
good art, see Clement Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART AND CULTURE:
CRITICAL ESSAYS 3, 3-22 (1971).
230. See DEUTSCHE, supra note 43, at 232-40; see generally BENJAMIN BUCHLOH, ET R
AL., ART SINCE 1900: MODERNISM, ANTIMODERNISM, POSTMODERNISM (2005).  For-
malist theories of modernist art share something in common with the “marketplace of
ideas” conception of freedom of speech: a belief in the existence of a singular truth,
objectively discoverable. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 6-12; Greenberg, supra note R
229, at 6. R
231. Beyond the difficulty of deciding what is art, some lawmakers contest the ap-
pellation of “artist.” See Greene, supra note 224, at 375 n.62 (“Senator Alphonse R
D’Amato famously tore up a reproduction of the photograph [Piss Christ] on the
Senate floor, saying that ‘[Andres] Serrano is not an artist.  He is a jerk.’”).
232. White v. City of Sparks, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1140 (D. Nev. 2004).
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Second Circuit, or the classification of a given work’s “message”
into certain approved categories, as in the Ninth Circuit.  In sum,
the jurisprudence in this area has three problems: it subjects visual
expression to capricious application of First Amendment interme-
diate scrutiny without defining its terms,233 it supposedly protects
“art” without clarifying why, and it perpetuates misunderstandings
about art’s relationship to objectivity and societal good.
B. Why Public Visual Expression Still Warrants Inclusion
in the First Amendment
Professor Thomas Emerson, a free speech theorist, has observed
four distinct values advanced by the First Amendment’s protection
of expression: (i) individual self fulfillment, (ii) advancement of
knowledge and discovery of truth, (iii) participation in decision
making by all members of society, and (iv) achieving a “more
adaptable and hence stable community.”234  Professor Baker has
condensed these to two in a theory of liberty: self-fulfillment and
public participation.235  Professor Redish has concluded, “the guar-
antee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, which
[is] ‘individual self-realization.’”236
The self-realization value is not monolithic because individual
self-realization embodies a number of other values within it, as part
of a “commitment to free expression.”237  Nor does this theory re-
ject the necessity of regulating free expression in light of other
competing social needs and values.238  Rather, Professor Redish’s
theory is based on an analysis of how free expression practically
and theoretically serves the well-being of democracy.  In this con-
ception, the democratic system has two kinds of values: the intrin-
sic values of self rule and self-control, which are achieved through
the existence of a democratic system in place, and the instrumen-
talist values that promote democracy, such as the development of
human faculties to assist in self-rule and self-control.239  Free ex-
pression fosters the intrinsic value of democracy directly by al-
233. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
234. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970); see
also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those
who won our independence believed . . . liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty.”).
235. BAKER, supra note 4, at 47. R
236. Redish, supra note 21, at 593. R
237. Id. at 594.
238. Id. at 595.
239. Id. at 602.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ305.txt unknown Seq: 34 10-SEP-07 13:17
1082 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
lowing individuals to participate in self-rule, and it fosters the
instrumentalist value indirectly by facilitating self-rule by allowing
people to cultivate their human faculties.240  This is an expansion of
the “classical” democratic theory that vaunted the opportunities
posed by political activity to enrich human life.241  In other words,
it is not only voting and politicking and political thought that de-
velop an individual’s critical intellectual faculties, but also a broad
array of expressive activities that may develop individual decision-
making power and increase human competence at self-rule and
quality living.242  The development of one’s full capabilities, either
through making or receiving expression, is actually an end in it-
self.243  This development may flourish even by “non-rational”
forms of expressive material.244
This is not an absolutist approach, because competing social
needs require balancing.  “Although the first amendment [sic] can-
not practically be interpreted to provide absolute protection, the
constitutional language and our own political and social traditions
dictate that the first amendment [sic] right must give way only in
the presence of a truly compelling governmental interest.”245
Others have theorized in the visual arts context that art deserves
unfettered protection against governmental meddling “because its
flourishing furthers the intangible and unquantifiable value of in-
creasing the people’s capacity to resist hegemony.”246  This concep-
tion of art as the Jeffersonian rebuke to tyranny is too limiting.
The value of free expression derives not only from serving society
by challenging our institutions, but also through the diffusion of
self-realizing behaviors in individuals.  Thus, when looking for the
scope of First Amendment protection in the realm of visual expres-
sion, the first question should not be whether or not the work
evinces a specific message, political or otherwise, but rather
whether or not the work serves to intellectually or extra-rationally
enrich its creator and her intended public.
What would this mean for the plaintiffs in the Mastrovincenzo
case and others working the streets and sidewalks of New York?
Only that any inquiry into the expressive qualities of their work
240. Id. at 604.
241. See id. at 603 (citing Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democ-
racy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 285, 288 (1966)).
242. See id. at 607.
243. See id. at 627.
244. Id. at 628.
245. Id. at 624-25.
246. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 112. R
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look to analyze expression as it serves the one making it, as well as
it serves its public, and dispense with balancing tests, indexing util-
ity, or looking for fixed messages that will tie in neatly with the
written or spoken word.  Ultimately the tests expounded by the
courts do not really clarify the individual’s interests at stake in the
balancing against the state’s—whether or not the court finds some-
one’s work ‘expression’ or only ‘predominantly expressive’ is irrel-
evant to that person’s interest in self-expression as compared to a
city’s interest in keeping the sidewalks clear.247
The Mastrovincenzo plaintiffs had strong interests, expressive
and otherwise, in vending their works on the sidewalk.  Santos, in
his declaration for the case, declared that his work was not only an
expression of the specific word or idea portrayed within his work,
but also a reflection of him as an individual artist and an identifica-
tion of his aesthetic upbringing.248  Mastrovincenzo stated that his
overarching expressive ambition was to work in a mode that his
audience would be able to appreciate and relate to.249  Both artists
had worked in other venues, but were aware of the depth that
street-sales could lend expressions, like graffiti, that are rooted in
urban public fora.250  The purpose of the work, to “convey[ ]
themes and voices of underrepresented individuals and groups in a
large urban environment,” relies on its situs in the public forum to
satisfy the creator’s expressive intentions and to facilitate the stim-
ulation of the viewer’s receptive faculties.251  Furthermore, as pri-
vate interests become ever more interlaced with public policy on
the street level,252 a proper weighing of the individual’s interest in
public self-expression becomes more important.  One of New York
City’s biggest problems with street vending in general is its suppos-
edly harmful effect on private businesses.253  I would suggest we
should be very careful when limiting public expressive activity at
the behest of purely commercial stake-holders, lest the application
of time, place, and manner restrictions on expression become a
mechanism for silencing unruly individuals and promoting a more
247. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 623-25. R
248. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir. 2006).
249. Id.
250. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
251. Id.
252. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Kettles, supra note 33, at 27- R
32 (discussing the lack of harmful effect posed by street vendors to fixed businesses in
Los Angeles).
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packaged culture.254  Given the sheer quantities of expression
foisted on most city-dwellers by advertisers and big players in the
culture industries, self-rule now more than ever requires citizens to
be able to sort through visual detritus to create expression that is
individuated, rather than borrowed or absorbed.  The Second Cir-
cuit’s dismissive “get thee to a gallery” routine would put both gov-
ernmental interests (not dealing with people selling art on the
streets) and fixed business interests (restricting the sales of cultural
property to particular venues, methods, people) above those of in-
dividuals engaged in public expression.255
C. What This Means for New York City’s GVL
The Second Circuit has determined that regulations that effec-
tively bar the sale of paintings, prints, sculptures, and photographs
on city sidewalks are invalid as time, place, and manner restric-
tions, but that identical treatment of other predominantly expres-
sive materials is permissible.256  This hierarchy sits on arbitrary and
uneven footing.257  The time, place, and manner restriction here
has been stretched to fit what the court perceives as the City’s
problem.  The City of New York is obviously concerned about a
glut of vendors selling kitsch on the sidewalks under the banner of
Freedom of Speech.258  But the present state of affairs under the
Bery consent decree, allowing free sales of mass-produced works
fitting into the privileged media categories, is one of the City’s own
making with the assistance of the federal courts.259  The current
system does not effectively differentiate meaningful or productive
expression from “regular merchandise” by giving blanket protec-
tion and making faulty assumptions.  Part of the problem is the
GVL itself, which caps outstanding licenses at such a small number
and makes fresh faces on the sidewalk marketplace impossible to
come by.260
254. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 185 (2000) (“In a context of media and market-
ing overload, meaningful opportunities to express our freedom—at levels loud
enough to break through the barrage of commercial sound effects and disturb the
corporate landlords—are disappearing fast around us.”).
255. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2006).
256. See id. at 102.
257. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
258. See Lueck, supra note 34. R
259. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
260. See Kernberg, supra note 56, at 173-74. R
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The Second Circuit has shown great deference to the City in
evaluating its interests with respect to those of individuals wishing
to engage in public expression, and thus the City’s regulatory
scheme has not come under serious scrutiny.261  In Mastrovincenzo,
the Second Circuit made no demand of proof that the plaintiffs, or
vendors in general, were the cause of the City’s pedestrian conges-
tion.  Instead, the court was satisfied with the City Council’s
twenty-seven-year-old explanation of why it passed the GVL.262  It
is unclear from the opinion whether the legislative history of Local
Law 50 of 1979—the law freezing the number of outstanding vend-
ing licenses—contained any statistical assessment of vending’s con-
261. In the Seventh Circuit, the City of Chicago has been held to a far more exact-
ing burden of proof of governmental interest, which has had the effect of putting cities
and citizens on a more level playing field. See Weinberg v. Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029
(7th Cir. 2002); Ayres v. Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).  The City of Chicago
has a “peddlers’ ordinance,” a licensing requirement for vendors. Weinberg, 310 F.3d
at 1033.  The ordinance forbids the vending of any goods, except newspapers, in pub-
lic or private areas so designated by the city council. Id. at 1035.  In the Ayres case, an
activist was ticketed under the peddlers’ ordinance for selling t-shirts that propagated
the views of her group, the “Marijuana Political Action Committee.” Ayres, 125 F.3d
at 1012.  The City argued that the prohibition on peddling throughout downtown Chi-
cago was justified by three benefits: the control of pedestrian congestion, limiting
competition with the city’s own vending activities, and “aesthetic” interests. Id. at
1015.  Judge Posner noted that the City was not required to take the least restrictive
approach to achieve its goals, but noted that where “the challenged regulation seems
likely to obliterate the plaintiff’s message, the existence of less restrictive alternatives
that would protect the valid regulatory interest is material to the constitutional issue.”
Id. at 1016.  In Weinberg, a man wishing to sell his self-described “screed” against
Chicago Blackhawks owner Bill Wirtz challenged a provision within the Chicago ped-
dling ordinance prohibiting peddling within a 1,000-foot radius of the City’s United
Center sports complex. Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1037.  The City asserted its interest in
keeping a clear thoroughfare in a heavily used public area and promoting public
safety. Id. at 1036.  Two city officials testified that peddling was a cause of disruptive
congestion, but a videotape of the plaintiff’s peddling activities made at the request of
the district court contradicted that testimony. Id. at 1038.  The court criticized the
city’s lack of real evidence supporting its position, declaring that “[u]sing a speech
restrictive blanket with little or no factual justification flies in the face of preserving
one of our most cherished rights.” Id. at 1039.  Because the vendor was targeting fans
of the Chicago Blackhawks specifically, there was no other venue through which he
could adequately replicate his stadium-side sales. Id. at 1041-42.  The court struck
down the ordinance as an unreasonable time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at
1042.
262. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 100 (2d Cir. 2006). The
court also omits any discussion of whether or not GVL § 20-453 is narrowly tailored
in light of the “other” time-place-manner regulations that govern vendors physically;
it is satisfied that no evidence suggests § 20-453 is “mere surplusage.” See id.  It is the
government’s burden to show justification and narrow tailoring, not the vendor’s. See
Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1038.
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tributions to congestion, or if it was mere conjecture.263  Either
way, New York City has not stood still in the interim.  This treat-
ment tips the balance of interests and trivializes the claims of in-
dividuals wishing to make use of public fora for expressive pur-
poses.  Given the fact that the City undermines its own licensing
scheme by widely excepting vendors of written material and
veterans,264 the Second Circuit’s “thumb on the scales” for the gov-
ernmental interest is especially frustrating.265
The current state of the law does not respect the individual’s self-
realization interest in creating works of visual expression, but at
the same time saddles cities with no way to meaningfully distin-
guish expression from decoration.  The simplest thing for the City
of New York to do to rectify the situation would be to increase the
number of outstanding vending licenses dramatically, or eliminate
the licensing requirement altogether.  This would either completely
free the sidewalks for expressive activity, or make it very difficult
for any aggrieved citizen to claim a de facto bar to expression
under the time, place, and manner rules.  This would, of course,
force the City to rely on its other time, place, and manner restric-
tions that govern the spatial setup of vending activities, to prevent
the excessive compaction of bodies in the streets.266
Should the City keep its current regime and policy of excepting
constitutional speakers from licensing, then the judicial tests for
delineating protected expression must be revamped.  As I have de-
scribed above, the blanket protection currently afforded certain
media categories is both under- and over-inclusive and severs any
tie between the purpose and administration of protection.267  The
self-realization interest of the individual has been diminished and
marginalized.268  Yet it is well within the sphere of judicial compe-
tence to make more balanced decisions on issues of public visual
263. See Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 100-01.  For an analysis of street vending’s
civic impact, and an argument that vending should be broadly legalized, see generally
Kettles, supra note 33. R
264. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 698 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he City’s
licensing exceptions for veterans and vendors of written material call into question
the City’s argument that the regulation is narrowly tailored.”).
265. Cf. Redish, supra note 21, at 624 (“[A]ny general rule of first amendment [sic] R
interpretation that chooses not to afford absolute protection to speech because of
competing social concerns is, in reality, a form of balancing.  The point, however, is to
balance with ‘a thumb on the scales’ in favor of speech.”).
266. The City may already rely on these “other” time, place, and manner restric-
tions contained in GVL § 20-456. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 698.
267. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 94.
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expression.269  The Second Circuit, in hearing Mastrovincenzo, was
able to make a determination of expressivity based on observation,
but encumbered its decision with unnecessary steps and procedures
in an attempt to make its decision objective.270  Courts, when con-
fronted with plaintiffs seeking First Amendment protection for
their public displays, should examine the work itself, the creator’s
explanation, and the role that the work plays, if any, in the cultural
context from which it springs.  Courts should not shutter them-
selves from the self-serving arguments of the individual—for would
courts deny constitutional protection to political literature because
it serves the financial or power interests of a candidate?  Works of
visual expression are due equal respect and cannot be analyzed in a
vacuum.  Were someone to claim First Amendment protection for
playing cards or mass-produced reproductions of old liquor adver-
tisements, the courts would be well justified to dismiss such materi-
als as not worthy of constitutional protection.271  But just as our
democratic values are “process-oriented,” meaning that going
through the procedures of democracy is good for the system and
for its participants, so could our expression values be “process-ori-
ented.”272  The value of free expression is conferred at many points
in the process—at conception, fixation, display, discussion, and cri-
tique.  Expression worthy of protection and true kitsch are differ-
entiated by the latter’s lack of self-realization in the process of
creation.  When the courts seize upon this distinction expression
may productively flourish while “regular merchandise” remains
under control, and our case law will be the simpler for it.
CONCLUSION
The current state of federal court decisions on why and how vis-
ual expression fits into the rubric of First Amendment protection is
unclear and does not fully serve the interests either of individuals
interested in creating expression, or of cities seeking to promote
orderly use of public fora.  Blanket protection for certain media or
themes does not effectively differentiate expression from inert
merchandise, and dilutes the meaning of First Amendment protec-
269. See Farley, supra note 80, at 857. R
270. Mastronvincezo, 435 F.3d at 97.
271. See People v. Saul, 776 N.Y.S.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (finding that
playing cards with pictures on the back did not constitute artistic or visual expres-
sion).  I would expand this reasoning to curtail the sales of many currently protected
materials, especially the mass-produced prints and photographs of landmarks sold to
tourists, under the Bery injunction.
272. Redish, supra note 21, at 602. R
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tion.  The courts should promote a theorization of the free expres-
sion right in the First Amendment that privileges the self-
realization interest of creators in making expressive works, and dis-
pense with trying to fit visual expression into analogy with written
materials or expressive conduct.  Expressive activities should be ef-
fectively decriminalized in order to stimulate popular creativity
and in doing so, stimulate the intellectual and critical faculties es-
sential for democratic self-rule and meaningful living.
